gobsmacked

it's not easy defending positions you've never actually thought about.

sully erna, frontman of top-of-the-charts grunge metal band godsmack, attempts to explain to jay babcock of arthur magazine why he doesn't have a problem with licensing his songs to the military for their recruitment videos:

jb:	well i have a quote from you here: "we've always been supportive of our country and our president, whereas a lot of people i thought" — and you said this in 2003 to mtv news, you said — "a lot of people i thought lashed out pretty quickly at what we did and i thought the government did everything pretty cleanly and publicly as possible."
se:	yeah ... ?
jb:	well, what are you talking about?
se:	that was my opinion at the time. the whole war thing, and trying to keep us up to date like ... if you remember, back in other wars, we didn't have the opportunity to follow it through the media, and cnn, and the news — live updates and that kind of thing. and i thought that for the most part you know we were allowed to follow it as best we could through the media sources that were feeding us information.
jb:	[incredulous] you didn't think the media was being controlled by the military?!?
se:	well, it could be. i don't know.
jb:	you didn't look into it?
se:	listen, are you a fucking government expert?

oh shit, another one of these friggin' experts! man, i couldn't get outta high school fast enough to get away from these geeks!

se:	so i just feel, well, you know, whatever we can do to say 'thank you for protecting our country' is what we try to do. i'm not trying to make this a big political issue.
jb:	okay. have you done anything to prevent people from joining the military?
se:	no.
jb:	to maybe educate them as to what's in store for them?
se:	i don't have enough education in the military to educate them in anything.

besides, it's not like there's any possible reason you wouldn't jump with both feet on gettin' your song in a recruiting vid, right?

se:	we just simply — an opportunity came up, they wanted to use some music for a recruit commercial. what are we gonna say, no?
jb:	yeah. how hard is it to say 'no'?
se:	why would we, though?!?
jb:	because —
se:	is it because you don't feel the same way about the government that we do, makes you right and us wrong?
jb:	yeah. what do you feel about the government? tell me what —
se:	aw, that's crazy, man! that's just an opinion.
jb:	i can back my opinion up from here to tomorrow if you would like to talk to me all day long.
se:	well, obviously you've done a lot of research and you've —
jb:	that's right, because —
se:	— got a different opinion. we don't know that stuff that you know, so —
jb:	why don't you do some research before you get involved with these sorts of things? you're talking about young kids' lives. you're talking about kids —
se:	[yelling] would you rather not have us be protected so they can come and overrun our country?!?

because, after all, if we were to actually do some research, the terrorists would win! but if you like your fuckin' research so much, they still got libraries in iraq!

jb:	you know what i'd like, sully? a department of defense. not a department of offense that attacks other countries — sovereign nations — who do things in a different way than us, who we have no right to go over and invade and change their governments. would we want someone else to do that to us?
se:	i'm not saying —
jb:	how hard is that to think about?
se:	i'm not saying that we were right on every war that we've created. i know that we've been damn wrong at times about stuff —
jb:	when have we been wrong?
se:	[yelling] but they have also been wrong too!
jb:	when have —
se:	i don't trust someone like fuckin' sadaam and osama to come in here and try to control —
jb:	[incredulous] when did sadaam try to come in here and control our country?
se:	dude, [yelling] why don't you go live in iraq then if you have such a problem with america? why are you here?

because, you know, you can love it or leave it, you osaddama-lovin' geek! love it or leave it!

now, if you'll excuuuse me, i have some recruiting song$ to cut.

now i could care less whether sully erna supports the troops, or how he chooses to demonstrate his support. there's a broader issue on display here.

the issue here, which jay babcock clearly illustrates, is that sully's position is completely bankrupt because he's made no effort to think about it in anything but the shallowest terms.

whatever your beliefs, especially if you actively promote them in order to influence the behavior of others, you have a responsibility to learn what all the facts are. because sully hasn't made any effort to learn anything about the military or the war, he's unable to offer any credible or coherent rebuttal to jay's arguments. all he has are cheap slogans.

sully obviously has no interest in the military beyond indulging himself in some kind of feel-good give-em-hell rock-and-roll fantasy that he's getting paid to promote. and not being in the military himself makes him not just an idiot but a hypocrite.

can't stand up for standing down

while efforts to recruit and train iraqis into a competent, independent and professional fighting force have been purportedly ongoing, with halting progress, since the overthrow of saddam hussein, at the end of last november the president officially declared these efforts to be one of the linchpins of his exit strategy, during his "strategy for victory in iraq" tour, a series of speeches aimed at once again shoring up his dying support among increasingly skeptical americans:

as the iraqi security forces stand up, their confidence is growing. and they're taking on tougher and more important missions on their own. as the iraqi security forces stand up, the confidence of the iraqi people is growing, and iraqis are providing the vital intelligence needed to track down the terrorists. and as the iraqi security forces stand up, coalition forces can stand down. and when our mission of defeating the terrorists in iraq is complete, our troops will return home to a proud nation. — president bush, annapolis naval academy, november 30

his strategy has been compared to "vietnamization", nixon's handing over of military operations to the south vietnamese army — a comparison the administration understandably has ignored, not wanting to evoke unsettling images of the fall of saigon.

the exact number of trained and ready iraqis once again became controversial in february when the only battalion — comprising 700 to 800 men — with a "level one" rating, meaning that it should be able to fight on its own, was downgraded by the pentagon to "level two", meaning that it requires support from coalition forces. "level three" battalions must be chaperoned by coalition forces.

in october the pentagon raised the number of iraqi battalions at level two to 53 from 36. 45 battalions are at level three. almost 100 iraqi army battalions are considered operational, and more than 100 iraqi security force battalions — those "under the direction of the iraqi government" — are operational at levels two or three. according to this accounting then, there are between 68,600 and 78,400 iraqis under the coalition's wing and at least 70,000 or more than 80,000 iraqis available to the iraqi government. (one question: those iraqi security force battalions at level three, therefore requiring a chaperone, are they under the command of the government or the coalition? my bets are on the coalition.)

meanwhile, either because of or in spite of the explosion of full-blown chaos after the bombing of golden dome, the newly-elected iraqi government remains stillborn amid intense sectarian disagreements, among them ibrahim jaafari's re-nomination to prime minister. it seems incapable of forming a "unity" government:

ap: leaders offered a myriad of reasons for the delay in forming a government, and their reasoning often reflected their religious or ethnic loyalties. shiite leaders accused american officials of interfering too much, saying the americans want to give sunnis more power than they earned in the election. sunnis charged that the other parties are not committed to a national unity government and are unwilling to share power.

beyond the simple act of opening parliament, the government is long overdue to perform any of its mandated duties, the very first being the naming of the speaker of the house:

juan cole: the iraqi parliament opened on thursday [march 16], and the 275 members took their oath of office, administered in the absence of an elected speaker of the house (on whom parliament could not decide) by senior statesman adnan pachachi (on the grounds that he is the oldest mp). some of the members objected to the form of the oath administered by the chief justice, on the grounds that it differed from the text that had been distributed beforehand, and some said it the way it had been written (-al-sharq al-awsat). the autnorities [sic] decided to let that pass. pachachi attempted to make a speech from the floor, lamenting the recent sectarian violence, but was interrupted by shiite cleric abdul aziz al-hakim, who said it was inappropriate for pachachi to do more than swear in the members of parliament.

and the non-"civil war" rages on unabated with its clearly ethnic bombings, reprisals and executions, with the continuing participation of iraq's security forces:

ap: also since the start of march, gunmen — mostly masked, many wearing police uniforms — have stormed at least six baghdad businesses. on wednesday, eight people were killed at the al-ibtikar trading company when they were lined up against a wall and shot, and six others were wounded. at least 90 workers have been kidnapped and tens of thousands of dollars stolen in the five other assaults.

can "iraqization" succeed under these conditions? not bloody likely. in at least one crucial aspect it is a very different process from "vietnamization". the government of south vietnam, corrupt and unpopular as it was, was not wracked to the core by sectarianism. the south vietnamese government could reasonably count on the loyalty of its troops, if not their strength.

there has been almost no reportage whatsoever on the issue of troop loyalties. to me it seems to be one of the elephants in the room regarding bush's exit strategery.

in order for "iraqization" to succeed, first, the mutually antagonistic elements of the duly elected iraqi government must come together as one and begin governing. until then it is a government in name only. second, the mutually antagonistic elements of the iraqi military and police forces will have to put loyalty to the government and its laws above loyalty to their particular family, tribe and imam. unfortunately, i don't see that happening with the current generation, certainly not while ethic violence continues in a self-consuming orgy. loyalty to the government cannot be taught in eight weeks of boot camp. what the bush administration calls "standing up", i call building american-trained and american-armed death squads.

if american troops are going home anytime soon, it won't be because the iraqi army is ready to "stand up".

(image courtesy of get your war on.)