but you already knew that, didn't you?

with the release of parts of the key judgements of the most recent national intelligence estimate (nie), the final linchpins to the administration's ever-shifting arguments for its continued occupation of iraq have been definitively yanked away, by the very community paid to know the facts better than anyone else on the planet. the last shreds of clothing have been snatched off the emperor, as explained by aj, a former defense intelligence officer who spent two years on iraq policy:

the recently-declassified nie titled "trends in global terrorism: implications for the united states", which was finalized nearly six months ago, is a devastating repudiation of virtually everything leading executive and defense department leaders have told americans about the war on terror. as i've written before, the most important thing to look for in this kind of analysis is trends. events are different than how things are going in general, and here's an example: the report states that u.s. efforts have damaged the leadership of al-qa'ida and "disrupted" is operations, which is almost certainly true. there have been plenty of operations disrupted. but that's a summary of events, not a trend. more important is the follow-up that "the global jihadist movement ... is spreading and adapting to counterterrorism efforts." event: we've done some good. trend: things are getting worse, not better. much of the initial assessment is uncontroversial. jihadism is decentralized, it's expanding, self-radicalized cells (especially in europe) are a growing threat, etc. the real meat, both analytically and politically, involves iraq. bear in mind that the report focuses on terrorism, not iraq per se, so it's instructive that a great deal of the summary addresses iraq. the iraq portion begins somewhat dubiously, with the statement that "perceived jihadist success there would inspire more fighters to continue the struggle elsewhere." that's disingenuous to the extent that jihadists already perceive success and fighters have already moved beyond iraq (claiming responsibility for attacks in jordan and other gulf states). the assessment that iraq "is shaping a new generation of terrorist leaders and operatives" is also not surprising, though i think more people should realize that a similar situation in afghanistan caused the rise of al-qa'ida in the first place. no matter how or when we leave, there will be trained and angry operatives who will lash out in the future. but to me, the most important, the scariest, and the most damning part of the entire summary is this single sentence: we assess that the underlying factors fueling the spread of the movement outweigh its vulnerabilities are [sic] are likely to do so for the duration of the timefram [sic] of this estimate. ladies and gentlemen, that's the ballgame right there. what this intelspeak means in english is, "the causes fueling terrorism outweigh the vulnerabilities of terrorists and their networks, and that fact is likely to be true indefinitely." the assessment is saying that the main motivations for terrorism — and the report puts iraq at the top of that long list — outweigh our ability to prevent it, meaning, essentially, that iraq is more harmful than helpful in our counterterror strategy. i already knew that, and so did most readers here, but i don't think that's the conventional wisdom. until now, at least. anyone who defends the iraq war now has to answer this question: the collective judgment of the entire u.s. intelligence community is that under the watch of the bush administration terrorism is becoming more of a threat, not less of one, primarily due to iraq. do you support continuing that failure, or changing the course to solve it? the bush administration is trying to spin the findings, saying that they reflect previous statements, but this response is pathetic. the spin conflates fact with trend, basically saying that president bush has stated some of the facts contained in the report (shorter version: "the report says al-qa'ida is bad. president bush has said al-qa'ida is bad!") while failing to address the assessment that things are getting worse, not better. one more time, because it's really a remarkable assessment, despite being in bureaucrat-speak: we assess that the underlying factors fueling the spread of the movement outweigh its vulnerabilities and are likely to do so for the duration of the timeframe of this estimate. those underlying factors are listed as, basically, entrenched grievances and humiliation; iraq; lack of political reform in muslim nations; and pervasive anti-u.s. sentiment among most muslims. these are all interconnected, of course, and bush administration policies, especially its intransigence on iraq, are hurting more than they are helping. analysts are generally discouraged from offering policy suggestions (that's for policymakers, not interpreters of information), but this transcends that usual prohibition a little, and the strongest statement is this: countering the spread of the jihadist movement will require coordinated multilateral efforts that go well beyond operations to capture or kill terrorist leaders. that is a concept this administration, and its rubber-stamp congress, simply doesn't seem able to grasp. the report is definitive, provocative, and damning, and every day between now and the elections democrats — and sane republicans — should demand accountability for these unconscionable failures of presidential and congressional leadership.

why are we still there?

(cross-posted at daily kos)

iraq: dateline, february 2006.

insurgents. jihadists. militias. suicide bombers. death squads.

at least 30,000 and up to 100,000 or even more dead; many tortured, executed. over 40,000 injured. perhaps 1,000 more each month.

in the midst of this abbatoir: a 20-something, over-extended guardsman from anytown u.s.a. who doesn't speak the language, doesn't look like the locals. her assigned task: "security". what can she secure? according to respected middle-east scholar juan cole, not much, not even her own safety:

"sunni arabs in iraq blamed us troops for not protecting sunni mosques and worshippers from violence. the us military ordered the us soldiers in baghdad to stay in their barracks and not to circulate if it could be helped. (later reports said some us patrols has been stepped up.) this situation underlines how useless the american ground forces are in iraq. they can't stop the guerrilla war and may be making it worst [sic]. last i knew, there were 10,000 us troops in anbar province with a population of 1.1 million. what could you do with that small force, when the vast majority of the people support the guerrillas? us troops would be useless if they hcad [sic] to fight in alleyways against sectarian rioters. if they tried to guard the sunni mosques, they'd have to shoot into shiite mobs, which would just raise the level of violence they face from shiites in the south."

it seems crystal clear that u.s. forces have been reduced to serving only one function in iraq: target practice. the majority of iraqis feel that attacks on u.s. troops are justified. with reconstruction effectively halted, and no further funds forthcoming, guess who bears the brunt of civilian frustration? as long as u.s. troops stay in iraq, they remain too convenient as scapegoats for everything there that continues to go wrong:

"on saturday, al-sadr's movement joined sunni clerics in agreeing to prohibit killing members of the two sects and banning attacks on each other's mosques. the clerics issued a statement blaming "the occupiers," meaning the americans and their coalition partners, for stirring up sectarian unrest." (AP)

having successfully alienated all the rival factions, the u.s. no longer can find any meaningful candidate to partner with. cooperation with the u.s. has become the literal kiss of death in iraq, delegitimizing and rendering impotent any iraqi that might still wish to help implement any american plan for recovery.

there have been many calls, out of feelings of both guilt and pride, to, in so many words, clean up the mess that iraq has become. such calls, even if somewhat narcissistic, might be lauded for their acceptance of our ultimate responsibility. others call for us not to allow iraq's oil infrastructure to become incapacitated or be altogether destroyed. such calls are compelling for their sobering practicality. still other calls demand that we keep the conflict from engulfing the entire region, for the sake of stability and security. but our guilt, pride, practicality, stability and security cannot be helped by staying in iraq if in fact our presence has no positive influence whatsoever.

withdrawal from iraq removes both a focus for much iraqi anger and an easy excuse for iraqi dysfunction. most importantly, withdrawal will save lives that can be saved. the time for withdrawal is long overdue.