... as enscribed in the year of our lord two-thousand-and-nine by the nimble penne of a most concerned defender of the fate of alle that is constitutional and deare to the heartes of alle patriotic natural-bourne citizens of this christian republic, he bearing witness from within the very crucible of justice itself:
* * * prologue * * *
lindsey had suggested the night before, “we’re the only ones standing between the attorneys for the government and the constitution,” and he had complete confidence we would acquit ourselves well. that turned out to be true.
* * * parte the first * * *
thursday, february 26, the elector suit in the state of indiana came up for a motions hearing.
counsel for the governor had filed a motion to dismiss on the basis of mootness (all statutory requirements had been completed, too late for remedy), lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (failure to state a claim upon which the court or governor could grant relief) and laches (slept on our rights by bringing the suit too late).
plaintiffs opposed the motion by suggesting the issues would never be moot and by invoking the exceptions to mootness, (1) the challenged action was too short in duration to fully litigate the issues and (2) there was a reasonable expectation the same complaint would result in the same action (capable of repetition yet evading review).
... let me state here that one thing you must always do is find a way to trap the opposition into either admitting your case, addressing issues in a way that leads to admission, or making allegations irrelevant to your case. then, you can take the gleanings from one case and apply it to another, until you get what you originally desired. it’s the best way.
you lead the opposition and the court one step at a time until you arrive where you wish to be.
my co-plaintiff arrived during the judge’s questioning of counsel, and the first thing he noticed was the judge’s reaction. it was clear that the issues before the judge were compelling, and that we had a much better case than expected.
when my turn came to speak, i immediately corrected counsel’s perception of our motives for bringing the suit, and i jumped all over his statement the electoral college arose in article II of the constitution. i directed him to the thought that whatever mechanism was put in place by the states could not deviate from the text of the constitution.
i proceeded to disassemble the rest of his arguments. i found myself drawing counsel into my argument by addressing him as, “esteemed counsel,” and referring to his statements as, “opinions.” this played a part later when counsel for the governor made another error in regard to the supremacy clause. i was gently chiding him for his errors.
both he and the judge found that amusing, as evidenced by their chuckles.
* * * parte the second * * *
... it appeared to both co-plaintiff and myself that the judge understood the form and substance of the “general election.” and, that’s the real issue in the elector suits. it’s to draw attention to the true substance of the election.
... whatever form and substance (mechanism) put in place by the states must be in agreement with the plain text, and that’s where the electoral college faces a question of unconstitutionality when it deviates from the text and intent.
the most important position anyone can take is to stand for the text and intent of the constitution.
in regard to the “natural born” question, i read from the law of nations, “the natives, or natural-born citizens, are those born in the country, of parents who are citizens,” and prefaced my remarks with the statement, “whatever the words, ‘natural born,’ mean, they must mean whatever they meant at the time the constitution was ratified.”
congress has no enumerated power to change the meaning of the words, “natural born,” just as they have no enumerated power to change the substance of “chusing of electors,” and neither do the states. that intrigued the judge.
... and, on that basis, i believe we won the judge’s heart and that of counsel. we may not prevail in our suit, but we’ve made the argument that needs to go forward in whatever case comes after. and, “oh, yes!” we told the judge up front that whatever decision he might make in regard to our suit, it would certainly not end the controversy.
... my co-plaintiff made that clear when he spoke near the end of the hearing and drew attention to our desire for trial.
he argued it would be in everyone’s best interest, including the court, the governor and the people, to face the issues now, discover the truth and move on. otherwise, there’s an unresolved controversy that will continue. my co-plaintiff balanced my passionate argument, in that, he brought a calm reasoning of explosive issues to the hearing.
* * * parte the third * * *
counsel for the governor responded at one point that pursuant to the supremacy clause, “congress was the proper forum to hear these issues, as the decisions of congress had supremacy over the governor of the state.”
when i had an opportunity to speak, i objected saying, “unlike esteemed counsel, i am not an attorney, nor a part of the attorney general’s office, neither am i a constitutional scholar, but my understanding of the supremacy clause was that ‘this’ constitution, and laws pursuant thereto, were the law of the land and supreme in every way.”
that drew chuckles from both counsel for the governor and the judge. it was very clear i was correct.
as the hearing ending, the judge thanked both counsel for the governor and plaintiffs for well-written briefs, outlining the issues, and indicated he appreciated the fact we were very well prepared for the hearing. he thanked us for our time and indicated he would review various statutes before making his decision. both tables thanked him.
... my co-plaintiff and i want to thank his friends for their support. we could not do it without them.
i wish to thank those who prayed. and, i wish to remind people it’s important that we continue praying for the judge. his eyes were opened, and i want very much to take these issues to trial. i cannot see how he can disagree with the united states supreme court, indiana supreme court, article ii or counsel for the governor.
* * * epilogue * * *
judge dismisses suit on obama’s citizenship
[march 16] a marion superior court judge today dismissed a lawsuit brought by two indiana men seeking to invalidate indiana’s election results based on president barack obama’s citizenship status.
at a hearing last month, attorneys representing gov. mitch daniels asked judge david dreyer to dismiss the lawsuit. filed in december, it is one of dozens across the country that have challenged obama’s eligibility to hold office based on his status as a “natural born citizen.” all have been unsuccessful.
... dreyer’s order today says the issue raised by the plaintiffs, steve ankeny, new castle, and bill kruse, roselawn, now is moot. it also says they have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and that they are barred from bringing the action under the legal doctrine of laches, which means the plaintiffs waited too long to assert a time-sensitive claim.
the suit said indiana’s 11 democratic electors weren’t properly chosen because daniels didn’t first verify the eligibility of obama or sen. john mccain, his republican opponent, to be president.
the indiana attorney general’s lawyers argued the suit should be tossed because the governor and the electors already had carried out their duties under election law. they said the u.s. congress would be the proper venue for a debate over how to verify the eligibility of candidates.