fireworks guaranteed

britain's times online gives the onion a run for its money:

'disneyland' comes to baghdad with multi-million pound entertainment park ... mr [llewellyn] werner, chairman of c3, a los angeles-based holding company for private equity firms, is pouring millions of dollars into developing the baghdad zoo and entertainment experience, a massive american-style amusement park that will feature a skateboard park, rides, a concert theatre and a museum. it is being designed by the firm that developed disneyland. "the people need this kind of positive influence. it’s going to have a huge psychological impact," mr werner said. the 50-acre (20 hectare) swath of land sits adjacent to the green zone and encompasses baghdad’s existing zoo, which was looted, left without power and abandoned after the american-led invasion in 2003. only 35 of 700 animals survived — some starved, some were stolen and some were killed by iraqis fearing food shortages. ... mr werner, who has been sold a 50-year lease on the site by the mayor of baghdad for an undisclosed sum, says that the time is ripe for the amusement park. "i think people will embrace it. they’ll see it as an opportunity for their children regardless if they’re shia or sunni. they’ll say their kids deserve a place to play and they’ll leave it alone."

indeed, in baghdad, what better time?

round-up of daily violence — monday 21 april 2008 around 8 am, three ieds planted in three cars targeted employees of the cabinet office. the first one was in dora and the employee was driving his own car the bmw when it exploded and he was injured in that incident. the second one targeted another employee who was injured as he was driving his hyundai car with another passenger who was sitting by him. the third one targeted a female employee’s car at alawi neighborhood. she was injured in that incident. around 10 am, two roadside bombs targeted two cars near the red crescent in mansour neighborhood. no casualties reported. around 11 am, random clashes took place at rubayee street of zayuna (east baghdad). six people were killed including a woman in that incident. around 3:20 pm, mortars hit the green zone (iz) in central baghdad. no casualties reported. around 4 pm, a roadside bomb targeted a kia mini bus near the oil marketing headquarter at zayuna neighborhood (east baghdad). one person was killed and five others were injured in that incident. around 4 pm, a mortar shell hit mashtal neighborhood (east baghdad). two people were injured in that incident. around 4 pm, clashes took place at mashtal neighborhood (east baghdad) between the iraqi army and the mahdi army. five people were injured in that clashes. around 6 and 6:30 pm, two katyusha missiles hit the supreme council headquarters. no casualties reported. around 6:10 pm, a katyusha missile hit the salhiyah compound (central baghdad). no casualties recorded, but some cars were damaged in that incident. police found 4 dead bodies in baghdad today: (3) were found in east baghdad (risafa bank); 1 was in zayuna, 1 was in husseiniyah and 1 was in mashtal. while (1) was found in dora.

baghdad green zone blasted under cover of storm militants bombarded baghdad's green zone with rockets on sunday, taking advantage of the cover of a blinding dust storm to launch one of the heaviest strikes in weeks on the fortified compound. ... iraqi police said eight missiles or mortars had hit the green zone and another 14 fell in other parts of the iraqi capital before nightfall in several quick bursts, killing two people and wounding 20. ... several more missiles were fired late on sunday evening but it was unclear if there were any casualties. militiamen have fired 700 missiles and mortars over the past month in baghdad, but u.s. forces had said they believed they had reduced the fighters' ability to strike the green zone by occupying the part of the sadr city slum closest to it. u.s. forces normally respond rapidly to missile firings with helicopter strikes, but those are impossible in dust storms.

quality of life indicators, april 20 2008 iraqi unemployment rate 27% to 60% where curfew not in effect consumer price inflation in 2006 50% iraqi children suffering from chronic malnutrition 28% in june 2007 percent of professionals who have left iraq since 2003 40% iraqi physicians before 2003 invasion 34,000 iraqi physicians who have left iraq since 2005 invasion 12,000 iraqi physicians murdered since 2003 invasion 2,000 pre-war daily hours baghdad homes have electricity 16 to 24 hrs average daily hours baghdad homes have electricity 5.6 hrs in may 2007 average daily hours iraqi homes have electricity 1 to 2 hrs number of iraqi homes connected to sewer systems 37% iraqis without access to adequate water supplies 70%

save our diplomats!

... from dubya! please!

oaths, the constitution, and the u.s. embassy in iraq the bush administration is taking a hard line on dragooning civilian foreign service officers into serving in the war zone of iraq. the article contains a quote by ambassador ryan crocker which says that the fso's swear an oath to serve anywhere in the world. this is not true. they swear an oath to uphold the constitution. they sign a contract that allows them to be posted anywhere. there is a difference, and the two documents may actually be in contradiction. for instance, what if the government did something unconstitutional and wanted to send you to support that action ... ? another retired u.s. diplomat sent me this: i am also a retired foreign service officer, and strongly second the view of the anonymous fso (retired) whom you cited in your column today. the issue really is not the commitment to world-wide service undertaken by fsos. the decision by the bush administration to not only keep an embassy open in a war zone, but increase its size to make it one of the largest in the world, is simply testimony to the madness of the entire iraq "adventure," and the fraudulent nature of the expressed rationale for our being there. most of the staff in this "embassy" do not speak the language and cannot act effectively as diplomats, even if that were the purpose in sending them there. but that is not the purpose. ... the willingness of secretary rice, or dr. ferragamo as she is known on one satirical website, to continue supporting this war of occupation through this "embassy" and more broadly through her declaration of a new order known as "transformational diplomacy" simply confirms that she is not a "moderate" voice for diplomacy against the likes of dick cheney. diplomats do not "transform" other countries. they represent the interests of the u.s. to the governments and citizens of other, independent, countries. again, please write your congressional representatives and senators, and contact your local democratic and republican party organizations, and urge them in the strongest terms to close down the us embassy in iraq. it has no business being there. it is under constant mortar and rocket attack, cannot actually conduct diplomacy, and is a thinly veiled viceregal palace intended to perpetuate bush's neo-colonialism. to end the war, begin with what is possible. close the embassy. save our diplomats. by the way, [this] is the sort of news still coming out of iraq every day, with 3 more us troops killed. that's a "lull"? and, see phillip carter on the dark side of the 'good news' about iraq. the fact is that it is still one of the most violent places on earth and the decline in fighting comes in part in baghdad because the city has gone from being 50/50 sunni and shiite to being 75% shiite, with much of this change having come in 2007 under the nose of the surge troops from the us. diplomacy with iraq's neighbors can be done outside iraq better. diplomacy with iraqi politicians can still be pursued (most of them live outside the country anyway). save the diplomats. save the world.

umm, that's no disguise

baghdad, iraq, july 28 — the two armored vans left a branch of the warka bank on thursday around noon, loaded with 1.191 billion dinars, or nearly $800,000. almost immediately, on a busy street near the baghdad zoo, the drivers spotted an oncoming iraqi army convoy, led by a shiny new humvee. they followed standard procedure and pulled over. but the convoy stopped, and an officer politely ordered the surprised drivers and guards to lay down their guns while his men searched the vans for bombs. within minutes all eight drivers and guards had been handcuffed and locked in the back of one of the vans on a suffocating 120-degree day, the cash had been stolen by the men in the convoy — whoever they were — and the iraqi banking system marked another day of its slow slide into oblivion. the only thing atypical about thursday’s robbery, which was described by bank and interior ministry officials, is that most private banks try to avoid using armored vans, because they draw too much attention, and instead toss sacks of cash into ordinary cars for furtive dashes through the streets of baghdad. however the cash goes out, it risks being lost in the wash of robbery, kidnapping and intrigue that now plagues the system. praised by the united states as a success story as recently as a few months ago, that system has quickly become a wild landscape of clandestine cash runs, huge hauls by robbers dressed as police officers and soldiers, kidnappings of bank executives with ransoms as high as $6 million, american allegations of tie-ins with insurgent financiers, and legitimate customers turned away when they go to pick up their savings and flee the country. "it is a crisis," said wisam k. jamil, managing director of iraq’s oldest private bank, the bank of baghdad, which lost $1.5 million in a literal case of highway robbery by men wearing police uniforms last december. because of that robbery, the bank lost much of its insurance coverage. even more galling for mr. jamil, the insurance policy had a standard disclaimer saying that losses due to acts of war or terrorism were not covered, and as the warka holdup on thursday illustrated, no one can say if a theft in iraq is committed by insurgents, bandits or genuine members of the security forces. so the insurance company has not paid mr. jamil’s claim ...

the times might prefer to whistle past facts aimed straight between its eyes, but it's all too crystal clear to the rest of us that iraq's highwaymen aren't just outlaws masquerading as police and military — it's far worse: they are the police and military.

(hat tip to steve gilliard.)

can't stand up for standing down

while efforts to recruit and train iraqis into a competent, independent and professional fighting force have been purportedly ongoing, with halting progress, since the overthrow of saddam hussein, at the end of last november the president officially declared these efforts to be one of the linchpins of his exit strategy, during his "strategy for victory in iraq" tour, a series of speeches aimed at once again shoring up his dying support among increasingly skeptical americans:

as the iraqi security forces stand up, their confidence is growing. and they're taking on tougher and more important missions on their own. as the iraqi security forces stand up, the confidence of the iraqi people is growing, and iraqis are providing the vital intelligence needed to track down the terrorists. and as the iraqi security forces stand up, coalition forces can stand down. and when our mission of defeating the terrorists in iraq is complete, our troops will return home to a proud nation. — president bush, annapolis naval academy, november 30

his strategy has been compared to "vietnamization", nixon's handing over of military operations to the south vietnamese army — a comparison the administration understandably has ignored, not wanting to evoke unsettling images of the fall of saigon.

the exact number of trained and ready iraqis once again became controversial in february when the only battalion — comprising 700 to 800 men — with a "level one" rating, meaning that it should be able to fight on its own, was downgraded by the pentagon to "level two", meaning that it requires support from coalition forces. "level three" battalions must be chaperoned by coalition forces.

in october the pentagon raised the number of iraqi battalions at level two to 53 from 36. 45 battalions are at level three. almost 100 iraqi army battalions are considered operational, and more than 100 iraqi security force battalions — those "under the direction of the iraqi government" — are operational at levels two or three. according to this accounting then, there are between 68,600 and 78,400 iraqis under the coalition's wing and at least 70,000 or more than 80,000 iraqis available to the iraqi government. (one question: those iraqi security force battalions at level three, therefore requiring a chaperone, are they under the command of the government or the coalition? my bets are on the coalition.)

meanwhile, either because of or in spite of the explosion of full-blown chaos after the bombing of golden dome, the newly-elected iraqi government remains stillborn amid intense sectarian disagreements, among them ibrahim jaafari's re-nomination to prime minister. it seems incapable of forming a "unity" government:

ap: leaders offered a myriad of reasons for the delay in forming a government, and their reasoning often reflected their religious or ethnic loyalties. shiite leaders accused american officials of interfering too much, saying the americans want to give sunnis more power than they earned in the election. sunnis charged that the other parties are not committed to a national unity government and are unwilling to share power.

beyond the simple act of opening parliament, the government is long overdue to perform any of its mandated duties, the very first being the naming of the speaker of the house:

juan cole: the iraqi parliament opened on thursday [march 16], and the 275 members took their oath of office, administered in the absence of an elected speaker of the house (on whom parliament could not decide) by senior statesman adnan pachachi (on the grounds that he is the oldest mp). some of the members objected to the form of the oath administered by the chief justice, on the grounds that it differed from the text that had been distributed beforehand, and some said it the way it had been written (-al-sharq al-awsat). the autnorities [sic] decided to let that pass. pachachi attempted to make a speech from the floor, lamenting the recent sectarian violence, but was interrupted by shiite cleric abdul aziz al-hakim, who said it was inappropriate for pachachi to do more than swear in the members of parliament.

and the non-"civil war" rages on unabated with its clearly ethnic bombings, reprisals and executions, with the continuing participation of iraq's security forces:

ap: also since the start of march, gunmen — mostly masked, many wearing police uniforms — have stormed at least six baghdad businesses. on wednesday, eight people were killed at the al-ibtikar trading company when they were lined up against a wall and shot, and six others were wounded. at least 90 workers have been kidnapped and tens of thousands of dollars stolen in the five other assaults.

can "iraqization" succeed under these conditions? not bloody likely. in at least one crucial aspect it is a very different process from "vietnamization". the government of south vietnam, corrupt and unpopular as it was, was not wracked to the core by sectarianism. the south vietnamese government could reasonably count on the loyalty of its troops, if not their strength.

there has been almost no reportage whatsoever on the issue of troop loyalties. to me it seems to be one of the elephants in the room regarding bush's exit strategery.

in order for "iraqization" to succeed, first, the mutually antagonistic elements of the duly elected iraqi government must come together as one and begin governing. until then it is a government in name only. second, the mutually antagonistic elements of the iraqi military and police forces will have to put loyalty to the government and its laws above loyalty to their particular family, tribe and imam. unfortunately, i don't see that happening with the current generation, certainly not while ethic violence continues in a self-consuming orgy. loyalty to the government cannot be taught in eight weeks of boot camp. what the bush administration calls "standing up", i call building american-trained and american-armed death squads.

if american troops are going home anytime soon, it won't be because the iraqi army is ready to "stand up".

(image courtesy of get your war on.)

why are we still there?

(cross-posted at daily kos)

iraq: dateline, february 2006.

insurgents. jihadists. militias. suicide bombers. death squads.

at least 30,000 and up to 100,000 or even more dead; many tortured, executed. over 40,000 injured. perhaps 1,000 more each month.

in the midst of this abbatoir: a 20-something, over-extended guardsman from anytown u.s.a. who doesn't speak the language, doesn't look like the locals. her assigned task: "security". what can she secure? according to respected middle-east scholar juan cole, not much, not even her own safety:

"sunni arabs in iraq blamed us troops for not protecting sunni mosques and worshippers from violence. the us military ordered the us soldiers in baghdad to stay in their barracks and not to circulate if it could be helped. (later reports said some us patrols has been stepped up.) this situation underlines how useless the american ground forces are in iraq. they can't stop the guerrilla war and may be making it worst [sic]. last i knew, there were 10,000 us troops in anbar province with a population of 1.1 million. what could you do with that small force, when the vast majority of the people support the guerrillas? us troops would be useless if they hcad [sic] to fight in alleyways against sectarian rioters. if they tried to guard the sunni mosques, they'd have to shoot into shiite mobs, which would just raise the level of violence they face from shiites in the south."

it seems crystal clear that u.s. forces have been reduced to serving only one function in iraq: target practice. the majority of iraqis feel that attacks on u.s. troops are justified. with reconstruction effectively halted, and no further funds forthcoming, guess who bears the brunt of civilian frustration? as long as u.s. troops stay in iraq, they remain too convenient as scapegoats for everything there that continues to go wrong:

"on saturday, al-sadr's movement joined sunni clerics in agreeing to prohibit killing members of the two sects and banning attacks on each other's mosques. the clerics issued a statement blaming "the occupiers," meaning the americans and their coalition partners, for stirring up sectarian unrest." (AP)

having successfully alienated all the rival factions, the u.s. no longer can find any meaningful candidate to partner with. cooperation with the u.s. has become the literal kiss of death in iraq, delegitimizing and rendering impotent any iraqi that might still wish to help implement any american plan for recovery.

there have been many calls, out of feelings of both guilt and pride, to, in so many words, clean up the mess that iraq has become. such calls, even if somewhat narcissistic, might be lauded for their acceptance of our ultimate responsibility. others call for us not to allow iraq's oil infrastructure to become incapacitated or be altogether destroyed. such calls are compelling for their sobering practicality. still other calls demand that we keep the conflict from engulfing the entire region, for the sake of stability and security. but our guilt, pride, practicality, stability and security cannot be helped by staying in iraq if in fact our presence has no positive influence whatsoever.

withdrawal from iraq removes both a focus for much iraqi anger and an easy excuse for iraqi dysfunction. most importantly, withdrawal will save lives that can be saved. the time for withdrawal is long overdue.