withdrawal symptoms

where most see the recent clash in basra between maliki's u.s.-backed forces and sadr's militiamen as a further slide into quicksand, bob wright @ bloggingheads.tv sees a bright red exit sign:

bob wright: well, let me tell you — get onto why i felt a little more sanguine after this, about the consequences of american withdrawal, or at least a little less concerned about the possibility of chaos engulfing the region if america withdraws. what you saw in this was that, contrary to some stereotypes, actually none of the parties involved are crazy, okay? maliki did miscalculate a little, but once he got himself into trouble, all of the parties saw that it was in their interest to work out a peaceful solution, and they did it. and they did it without any american help. they did with iranian help. we were not involved in the solution. they worked it out without us, okay? the only effect we may have had is by doing a little more — helping maliki inflict a little more damage than he would have otherwise. it may have weakened sadr's bargaining position a little, so maybe he got a little worse deal than he would have, but as you yourself said, it's far from clear whether it's better that sadr lose or that he prevail among the shiites. i mean, we don't even — we just don't know. the main thing is that first you get order on the shiite side, then you can proceed to hope for shiite-sunni reconciliation, and as far as the ordering process on the shiite side, i thought they passed the test. y'know, they worked it out. it's stable, it did not — all hell did not break loose. we had nothing to do with the solution. iran did, and that's just ... what we're stuck with is that iran is going to be the source of, a great source of power in the shiite south, and we insured that by invading iraq, and we gotta live with it.

unfortunately both pride and greed make it extremely unlikely that america will decide to "live with it", which guarantees that we'll continue to overstay our welcome in southern iran iraq ...

how to make a martyr

nir rosen @ iraqslogger:

hijacking eid and hanging saddam the important muslim holiday of eid al adha was due to begin over the weekend. for sunnis it began on saturday the 30th of december. for shias it begins on sunday the 31st. according to tradition in mecca, battles are suspended during the hajj period so that pilgrims can safely march to mecca. this practice even predated islam and muslims preserved this tradition, calling this period 'al ashur al hurm,' or the months of truce. by hanging saddam on the sunni eid the americans and the iraqi government were in effect saying that only the shia eid had legitimacy. sunnis were irate that shia traditions were given primacy (as they are more and more in iraq these days) and that shias disrespected the tradition and killed saddam on this day. because the iraqi constitution itself prohibits executions from being carried out on eid, the iraqi government had to officially declare that eid did not begin until sunday the 31st. it was a striking decision, virtually declaring that iraq is now a shia state. eid al adha is the festival of the sacrifice of the sheep. some may perceive it as the day saddam was sacrificed. ... although the shia dominated iraqi media claimed saddam was terrified prior to his execution and fought with his hangmen, saddam's on screen visage was one of aplomb, for he was conscious of the image he was displaying and wanted to go down as the grand historic leader he believed himself to be.

the new york times:

u.s. questioned iraq on the rush to hang hussein none of the iraqi officials were able to explain why mr. maliki had been unwilling to allow the execution to wait. nor would any explain why those who conducted it had allowed it to deteriorate into a sectarian free-for-all that had the effect, on the video recordings, of making mr. hussein, a mass murderer, appear dignified and restrained, and his executioners, representing shiites who were his principal victims, seem like bullying street thugs. but the explanation may have lain in something that bassam al-husseini, a maliki aide closely involved in arrangements for the hanging, said to the bbc later. mr. husseini, who has american citizenship, described the hanging as "an id gift to the iraqi people."

nir rosen @ iraqslogger:

saddam had been in american custody and was handed over to iraqis just before his execution. it is therefore hard to dismiss the perception that the americans could have waited, because in the end it is they who have the final say over such events in iraq. iraqi officials have consistently publicly complained that they have no authority and the americans control the iraqi police and the army. it is therefore unusual that iraqis would suddenly regain sovereignty for this important event.

digby @ hullaballoo:

bush's law: if it's possible to make things worse, he will. saddam hussein is the the man i would have thought was least likely to be turned into a martyr, but damned if they didn't manage to do it. bush's law. and here's the great thing about it — the us, which claims rather unconvincingly that it had no say in this because iraq is a sovereign country, gets blamed for this right along with the shi'a government and moqtada al sadr. terrific. lose, lose for us — as usual. heckuva job, bushie.

christopher hitchens @ slate: (hitchens has been called "the gold standard for leftwingers who had adopted the neocon stance on iraq", so his post represents something of an ongoing epiphany)

lynching the dictator ... in spite of his mad invective against "the persians" and other traitors, the only character with a rag of dignity in the whole scene is the father of all hangmen, saddam hussein himself. ... the said chief perpetrator was snatched from the dock — in the very middle of his trial — and thrown as a morsel to one of the militias. this sort of improvised "offing" is not even a parody of the serious tribunal that history demands. ... did our envoys and representatives ask for any sort of assurances before turning over a prisoner who was being held under the geneva conventions? ... we have helped to officiate at a human sacrifice. for shame. ... to have made the butcher saddam into a martyr, to have gratified one sect, and to have cheated millions of iraqis and kurds of the chance for a full accounting — what a fine day's work!

p.z. myers @ science blog pharyngula:

how can they screw up this badly? why is it that i, nasty ol' atheist who is completely ignorant of theology and religious history, can see the parallels in the execution of hussein, but our theocracy-sympathizing leaders bumble along, failing to see the damning errors of their position? ... you know, foreign occupying power, powerful religious group agitating for the execution of a hated, charismatic competitor, promises of who will bear the guilt for the deed, metaphorical washing of the hands ... jebus, if i know what a counterproductive pr disaster that was for the pharisees and the romans, what's the matter with the american leadership in iraq? don't they read the bibles they thump? add to that that they've apparently done the execution at a time when it is "religiously unacceptable", and we've got a situation that makes pontius pilate look good.

the new york times:

at the burial, several mourners threw themselves on the closed casket. one, a young man convulsed with sobs, cried: "he has not died. i can hear him speaking to me." another shouted, "saddam is dead! instead of weeping for him, think of ways we can take revenge on the iranian enemy," sunni parlance for the shiites now in power.

the los angeles times:

sunni grief, anger flow at funeral "today they proved themselves that the trial and the execution were mere retaliation and not justice," said a mourner from tikrit, near al auja, who gave his name only as abu mohammed, a customary nickname. "it is clear now against whom we should retaliate."

booman @ the booman tribune:

shrine desecration and other happy news the execution of saddam was handled very badly. there were many errors, but allowing footage of the executioners yelling 'moqtada, moqtada, moqtada' was perhaps the worst mistake. the sunni response, breaking into the samarra shrine and parading around a faux-coffin of saddam the martyr-hero, is about the worst sacrilege imaginable. imagine a bunch protestants blowing the dome off of st. peter's cathedral. then imagine them breaking into the church and parading around pictures of hitler and mussolini. there is not going to be any end in the cycle of sectarian violence.

why are we still there?

(cross-posted at daily kos)

iraq: dateline, february 2006.

insurgents. jihadists. militias. suicide bombers. death squads.

at least 30,000 and up to 100,000 or even more dead; many tortured, executed. over 40,000 injured. perhaps 1,000 more each month.

in the midst of this abbatoir: a 20-something, over-extended guardsman from anytown u.s.a. who doesn't speak the language, doesn't look like the locals. her assigned task: "security". what can she secure? according to respected middle-east scholar juan cole, not much, not even her own safety:

"sunni arabs in iraq blamed us troops for not protecting sunni mosques and worshippers from violence. the us military ordered the us soldiers in baghdad to stay in their barracks and not to circulate if it could be helped. (later reports said some us patrols has been stepped up.) this situation underlines how useless the american ground forces are in iraq. they can't stop the guerrilla war and may be making it worst [sic]. last i knew, there were 10,000 us troops in anbar province with a population of 1.1 million. what could you do with that small force, when the vast majority of the people support the guerrillas? us troops would be useless if they hcad [sic] to fight in alleyways against sectarian rioters. if they tried to guard the sunni mosques, they'd have to shoot into shiite mobs, which would just raise the level of violence they face from shiites in the south."

it seems crystal clear that u.s. forces have been reduced to serving only one function in iraq: target practice. the majority of iraqis feel that attacks on u.s. troops are justified. with reconstruction effectively halted, and no further funds forthcoming, guess who bears the brunt of civilian frustration? as long as u.s. troops stay in iraq, they remain too convenient as scapegoats for everything there that continues to go wrong:

"on saturday, al-sadr's movement joined sunni clerics in agreeing to prohibit killing members of the two sects and banning attacks on each other's mosques. the clerics issued a statement blaming "the occupiers," meaning the americans and their coalition partners, for stirring up sectarian unrest." (AP)

having successfully alienated all the rival factions, the u.s. no longer can find any meaningful candidate to partner with. cooperation with the u.s. has become the literal kiss of death in iraq, delegitimizing and rendering impotent any iraqi that might still wish to help implement any american plan for recovery.

there have been many calls, out of feelings of both guilt and pride, to, in so many words, clean up the mess that iraq has become. such calls, even if somewhat narcissistic, might be lauded for their acceptance of our ultimate responsibility. others call for us not to allow iraq's oil infrastructure to become incapacitated or be altogether destroyed. such calls are compelling for their sobering practicality. still other calls demand that we keep the conflict from engulfing the entire region, for the sake of stability and security. but our guilt, pride, practicality, stability and security cannot be helped by staying in iraq if in fact our presence has no positive influence whatsoever.

withdrawal from iraq removes both a focus for much iraqi anger and an easy excuse for iraqi dysfunction. most importantly, withdrawal will save lives that can be saved. the time for withdrawal is long overdue.